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Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Richard Miller 
 
Contradictory yet pragmatic on ABM and NMD 
Russia has taken a two-track approach on the related issues of the ABM Treaty 
and a proposed US National Missile Defense (NMD) system. On one hand, it still 
defends continuation of the treaty and opposes any US NMD development. It 
courted international support for this position during the recent G-8 meetings and 
indirectly through the Sino-Russian Friendship Treaty signed two weeks ago. On 
the other hand, in the face of apparent US determination and a successful 
missile intercept, signals from the Kremlin in the past few days indicate a 
possible opening for renewed negotiations with the US. 
 
Building opposition with China.... 
Russia and China oppose any US NMD system for a variety of reasons. Russia 
clings to its superpower image mostly because it remains one of the two largest 
nuclear powers. In Moscow's eyes, any ability to lessen the relative value of such 
weapons further reduces Russia's sway and influence in the world. Furthermore, 
Beijing views any such system as a possible means of enabling Taiwan to stiffen 
its resistance to mainland domination. Moscow and Beijing continue to portray 
the ABM Treaty as a "cornerstone of strategic stability" -- a point with which at 
least a few of the European NATO members agree.  
 
Moscow and Beijing appear to be seeking the moral high ground on arms control 
to drive a split between the US and its traditional allies on the NMD issue. Duma 
Speaker Gennady Seleznev noted during Chinese President Jiang Zemin's visit 
to Russia that "Moscow's and Beijing's firm and categorical 'no' to US plans to 
destroy the 1972 ABM Treaty has been met with understanding and support 
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basically by the entire world." (ITAR-TASS, 1934 GMT, 16 Jul 01; FBIS-SOV-
2001-0716, via World News Connection) Chinese opposition to any US 
abrogation of the ABM treaty is particularly interesting considering that China is 
not even a party to it. All of this comes despite the fact that serious US concerns 
about the global spread of nuclear and missile technologies, which drive support 
for NMD, are largely a result of Russian and Chinese clandestine violations of 
nonproliferation agreements. Both countries repeatedly insist their friendship 
treaty is not a new military alliance and is not directed against anyone. They 
make this claim so often and so vigorously, usually in the context of discussions 
on the proposed US NMD system, as to cast doubt on their claims. In fact, Jiang 
said during one of these sessions, "we believe that more active cooperation 
between our countries in discussing missile defenses and disarmament will 
enhance our efforts in building a multi-polar world and establish a fair, rational 
international order." (THE NEW YORK TIMES, 17 Jul 01)  
 
Given the known opposition of both countries to US NMD plans, it seems this 
new treaty has an underlying thrust against the US, although not stated 
specifically in the text. The timing of Jiang's visit and treaty signing and the 
Genoa G-8 summit also was advantageous for Moscow. It allowed Putin greater 
standing to try and position himself as the spokesman at the summit for a larger 
international group disgruntled at American leadership and initiatives. At the G-8, 
Putin reiterated Russia's adherence to the ABM Treaty and pushed for ratification 
of the Kyoto environmental protocol -- also in direct opposition to the US. Just 
prior to his second meeting with President Bush in Genoa, Putin told a Milan 
paper, "In the West, everyone says we don't want new divisions in Europe, we 
don't want new Berlin Walls. Good. We completely agree." (THE WASHINGTON 
TIMES, 17 Jul 01) 
 
Actions speak louder than words.... 
Yet, despite all of Moscow's bluster about one Europe with no lines of division 
and no threats requiring missile defenses, the Russians are completing work on 
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a new missile attack early- warning radar station in Belarus. Testing is underway 
and the station is expected to be on-line by the end of the year, replacing the 
older, and now decommissioned, station in Skrunda, Latvia. The most interesting 
feature of this new station is that it provides advanced monitoring of the airspace 
to the west and northwest of its location. (MAYAK RADIO, 0300 GMT, 17 Jul 01; 
FBIS-SOV-2001-0717, via World News Connection) This suggests that Moscow 
views the Western approaches to be of concern, not the southern regions, the 
area of weapons proliferation regarding which Russia has voiced apprehension 
in the past. With very limited resources for advanced military system 
development, one must assume Russia is investing in such systems only where 
it truly perceives a threat. 
 
Pragmatism comes into play.... 
In an approximately 30-minute period on 14 July, a US interceptor missile 
launched from Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands successfully found and 
destroyed a target ballistic missile launched from Vandenburg Air Force Base in 
California. The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization director, General Ron 
Kadish, announced, "We believe we have a successful test in all respects at this 
time." The success means that two of four flight tests of the antimissile system 
conducted since October 1999 have hit their targets and comes at a critical 
moment when the US Congress is debating a Bush Administration plan that 
could boost NMD spending by nearly 60% and accelerate testing.  
 
Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Aleksandr Yakovenko stressed this test 
posed another threat to the whole "international architecture" in the field of 
nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation centered on the 1972 ABM Treaty. 
(ITAR-TASS, 0945 GMT, 15 Jul 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0715, via World News 
Connection) In the face of this test, and indications from President Bush and 
National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice that the US will push ahead with 
NMD plans with or without the Russians, Putin's sense of pragmatism seems to 
have opened the door for a dialogue.  
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In fact, the conciliatory tone from US Secretary of State Colin Powell left a face-
saving invitation open for the Russians. "We need an understanding, an 
agreement, a treaty, something with the Russians that allows us to move forward 
with our missile defense programs. Sometime in the not too distant future we're 
going to need relief," Powell added, for the administration to test and build missile 
defenses without breaking the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. He suggested a 
written "understanding" or "joint statement," even if it fell short of a formal treaty. 
(WASHINGTON POST, 14 Jul 01) While the Russians have threatened 
increasing their nuclear arsenal and asymmetric responses to US NMD, Putin 
knows he cannot afford such a course of action. Any strategic rearmament 
program financially kills his other plans for military reform and threatens the 
fragile economic development in Russia. By accepting the recent US 
representatives to open the discussion simultaneously on both the strategic 
offensive and defensive, Putin has positioned himself to make concessions on 
US NMD goals, reduce an offensive weapons arsenal he can no longer afford to 
maintain and all the while try to present the world with a Russian image of a 
responsible superpower. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Luba Schwartzman 
 
FEDERAL ASSEMBLY 
The spring session of the State Duma of the Russian Federation closed on the 
evening of Saturday, 14 July. At a press conference that followed, Duma 
Speaker Gennady Seleznev announced that, during the five-month spring 
session, the Duma held 44 plenary and 7 additional sittings, adopted 4 
constitutional laws and 155 federal laws, ratified 27 international treaties and 
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agreements and considered 58 out of the 83 priority laws on the spring agenda. 
Seleznev also told the press that the lower house already has worked out a 
tentative plan of action for the autumn session, and that special attention will be 
given to the Labor Code, the Land Code, the Tax Code, the Criminal Procedure 
Code, and a number of draft law packages on judicial and pension reforms. The 
autumn session will be held from 10 September until 28 December. (ITAR-TASS, 
1624 GMT, 14 Jul 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0714, and ITAR-TASS, 1956 GMT, 13 Jul 
01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0713, via World News Connection)  
 
A few days earlier, Russian President Vladimir Putin already was praising the 
Duma for its work. He said that it had approved "crucial laws, including in 
political, economic, land and pension areas... If we bring this work to the end one 
can say we have considerably advanced towards the modernization of the 
government... It has been a long time since the Duma did such hard, responsible, 
and professional work." (ITAR-TASS, 1430 GMT, 12 Jul 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-
0712, via World News Connection)  
 
This "professionalism" of the deputies was challenged by the row surrounding the 
Land Code. Emotions did not run as high on 14 July when the draft Land Code 
was passed in the second reading (by a vote of 253 to 152, with 6 abstentions) 
as they had on the day of the first reading (See THE NIS OBSERVED, 11 Jul 
01), but about 100 supporters from the Communist and Agrarian parties did 
gather outside the State Duma Assembly, sporting signs like "Down with the 
Bourgeoisie!," "No to Land Trade," "We won't let them sell out Russia," and even 
"We'll remember each of you." Liberal-Democrat Vladimir Zhirinovsky complained 
that protesters threw eggs, stones and weights at him when he was entering the 
building Saturday morning, and suggested that protection for Duma deputies was 
necessary. The Moscow Committee of the Communist Party responded by 
accusing Zhirinovsky of provoking protesters, adding that "had the Communists 
really wanted to injure Zhirinovsky, they would have hit the target." (INTERFAX, 
1725 GMT, 14 Jul 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0714, and ITAR-TASS, 1519 GMT, 14 Jul 
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01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0714, via World News Connection) The real controversy, 
however, still may lie ahead, when the government expresses its position on the 
purchase and sale of farmland. 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
New and improved faction created 
The newly created Fatherland-Unity alliance, known officially as the All-Russian 
Union Unity and Fatherland, is the new-and-improved pro-government faction. At 
the short-and-sweet 45-minute constituent congress on 12 July (compare to the 
22-hour congress at which the factions that had made up the Union of Right 
Forces officially became a party) representatives unanimously elected Moscow 
Mayor Yuri Luzhkov and Emergencies Minister Sergei Shoigu co-chairmen, 
approved the union's charter, and issued a joint statement of support for the 
Russian presidential policy. This statement also presented the union's primary 
"fundamental values": patriotism, freedom and justice. The union has been 
expected for months (see THE NIS OBSERVED, 13 Jun 01) and far-reaching 
statements have been made to imply that it is a sign of the times. President Putin 
said that the union "shows that national interests have come to dominate over the 
interests of parties." Union of Right Forces Chairman Boris Nemtsov suggested 
that the merger "implies the authorities' drift to the left."  
 
And while the Communists claim that they "do not fear an early election of the 
State Duma in fall or winter," the new union seems intent on initiating early 
parliamentary elections. Franz Klintsevich, the acting chairman of the Unity 
political council, explained that this is necessary because "the current balance of 
forces in the State Duma does not correspond to the actual state of affairs in 
Russia, where more than 70 percent of the people support the president." He 
also said that the Unity-Fatherland alliance could count on getting 46 percent of 
the votes in the next election. (INTERFAX, 1120 GMT, 16 Jul 01; FBIS-SOV-
2001-0716, ITAR-TASS, 1743 GMT, 10 Jul 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0710, 
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INTERFAX, 1128 GMT, 12 Jul 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0712, and INTERFAX, 1140 
GMT, 12 Jul 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0712, via World News Connection)  
 
REGIONS 
Control tightens 
An interesting development in the Putin government vs. the communists equation 
has been the very recent gubernatorial election in the Nizhegorod oblast'. 
Gennady Khodyrev ran as a Communist, but suspended his membership as 
soon as he was proclaimed the winner (receiving 59.8 percent of the vote) on 29 
July. This is the first step toward fulfilling his promise to measure his actions 
against those of Vladimir Putin (whose Unity membership is likewise suspended), 
to cooperate with the presidential plenipotentiary to the Volga federal district, 
Sergei Kirienko, and to choose cadres based on professional qualities rather 
than on political allegiances. This comes amid suspicions that Gennady 
Zyuganov would rule Nizhegorod through a Communist leader, possibly even 
moving the capital of the oblast' to Saratov. His thanks -- a Kremlin source has 
offered the prospect of cooperation. (NTV, 30 Jul 01; via www.ntv.ru)  
 
Another Soviet relic under discussion has been the Kaliningrad region. President 
Putin called for a coordination of ministries and services in the enclave, which 
could "serve as a testing ground for interaction between Russia and Europe." 
The "concept of the region's development" was discussed at a meeting of the 
Russian Federation Security Council; it will not, as was rumored, be made a new, 
eighth, federal district. A new and complex program has, however, been 
developed. Viktor Cherkesov, President Putin's plenipotentiary to the 
Northwestern federal district, has appointed a special deputy for Kaliningrad and 
has said that certain cadre changes which "will allow the situation to be controlled 
in the future" have been made, particularly in the power and security organs. 
(INTERFAX, 1451 GMT, 26 Jul 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0726, via World News 
Connection, and ORT, 26 & 27 Jul 01; via www.ortv.ru)  
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MEDIA 
Reporters' powers restricted 
That the month of August means trouble for Russia, has become a sad but true 
cliché. In Chechnya, one precautionary measure has been a restriction imposed 
on reporters' traveling outside the military bases of federal troops. As of 26 July, 
journalists have to be accompanied everywhere by press service officers. It is 
unlikely that there will be enough of these officials to go around. According to 
military spokespersons, journalists had been seen with representatives of either 
the Chechen special police forces or the local Chechen police, and hence the 
new rule. An NTV journalist has found that the attitude towards reporters was 
formulated best by the chief of the General Staff, Anatoly Kvashnin, who said: "I 
just don't understand why you're trying to get out with the military operations all 
the time. I'll repeat this one more time: a military operation in the army is when 
you and I are here, and the enemy is over there -- just sitting there, not leaving. 
Do you understand me? If the bandit doesn't go away, one has to destroy him 
there. You are not working correctly... You're working for war, we are working for 
peace. That's how it is." (ITAR-TASS, 1054 GMT, 26 Jul 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-
0726, via World News Connection, and NTV, 26 Jul 01; via www.ntv.ru) This 
comes a week after the military took away the diesel generator on which all of the 
television channels depend (except NTV, which has its own generator, one that 
is not strong enough to be able to provide power for the other channels). 
 
At least there seems to be some level of resolution at Ekho Moskvy radio station: 
A controversial 9.5% stake in the radio station -- owned originally by Gusinsky, 
transferred to the journalists of Ekho Moskvy but intercepted and appropriated by 
Gazprom, then promised to SPS leader Boris Nemtsov -- in the end, has been 
slated to be given to Yevgeny Yasin, former economics minister and rector of the 
Higher School of Economics, as well as a frequent contributor to Ekho-Moskvy. 
(INTERFAX, 1523 GMT, 17 Jul 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0717, via World News 
Connection)  
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JUDICIARY 
Damned if you do, damned if you don't  
Vladimir Zhbankov, the deputy chief of the justice ministry's Moscow department, 
declared that "the Salvation Army has displayed a total disrespect for Russian 
laws when trying to avoid them and registered as a religious organization when it 
is not one." More precisely, the Salvation Army is in trouble: When the application 
for re-registration it filed six months ahead of the December 1999 deadline was 
denied because "the constituent documents were juridically incorrect," it did not 
obediently make the changes but appealed to higher courts. The latest (third) 
appeal was scheduled for 9 July, but has been delayed until 11 September. 
(INTERFAX, 0906 GMT, 9 Jul 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0709, via World News 
Connection) There are rumors, however, that it is precisely because the 
Salvation Army is a religious organization that the Moscow authorities are making 
the process difficult. The Russian Orthodox Church, which "enjoys a 
conspicuously close relationship with Yuri Luzhkov, the Mayor of Moscow, is 
behind the campaign to shut it down," writes The Times Moscow correspondent. 
None of the other Russian cities in which the Salvation Army is registered has 
denied the charitable organization a work permit. (THE TIMES, 9 Jul 01; via 
www.thetimes.com) 
 
In response, Yelena Speranskaya, the spokeswoman for the Moscow 
Patriarchate, denied that the Russian Orthodox Church initiated the process, but 
admitted that, while the charity efforts of the Salvation Army deserve "great 
respect," the Orthodox Church does not approve of the accompanying 
missionary activities, and regards them as proselytism, or "an attempt to win over 
believers." (INTERFAX, 0917 GMT, 9 Jul 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0709, via World 
News Connection) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Richard Miller 
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Criminal prosecutions stem from Chechen operations: Professional 
reform? 
A presidential aide, Sergei Yastrzhembsky, announced on 19 July that 82 
criminal cases have been initiated against servicemen for crimes against civilians 
since operations in Chechnya resumed in October 1999. (INTERFAX, 0725 
GMT, 19 Jul 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0719, via World News Connection) 
Furthermore, six servicemen have been detained for possible criminal charges 
based on the Russian prosecutors' investigation into "special" operations 
conducted against three Chechen villages in early July. (INTERFAX, 0755 GMT, 
19 Jul 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0719, via World News Connection)  
 
If this is the beginning of a true attempt to impose discipline and standards on the 
military forces, then it marks a positive step in the drive for professional reform. 
However, the announcement has the air of a public relations gimmick coming on 
the heels of further international outcry over Russian atrocities and the fact that 
statements given by Yastrzhembsky's office literally do not add up. In the 
statement cited above, supposedly 30 of the 82 cases are in connection with 
murders. Further numbers were given for different types of crimes. However, in 
another Interfax article, the numbers from Yastrzhembsky's office and the military 
prosecutor differed. The military prosecutor indicated only 7 murder cases were 
under consideration; moreover, the breakdown of the various crimes given did 
not match the 82 mentioned by Yastrzhembsky's office. (INTERFAX, 0752 GMT, 
19 Jul 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0719, via World News Connection) Given the volume 
of reports from independent sources concerning atrocities committed by Russian 
troops, either 7 or even 30 seem to be paltry numbers of prosecutions for murder 
cases if there is serious interest in proper discipline in the Russian armed forces. 
Combined with recent further restrictions on travel by journalists, the main source 
of reports on human rights violations by Russian troops, it is doubtful that the six 
recent arrests are more than a token effort.  
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Friendship Treaty: Not a military alliance, but accompanied by lots of 
weapons 
China signed a contract with the Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aviation Production 
Association worth $2 billion for Su-30 MKK ground-attack planes. The total 
number of planes to be transferred under this agreement is approximately 40. 
The Military News Agency, AVN, said the new contract would support nearly 
5,000 workers at the factory. These aircraft complement the 1999 deal for 40 Su-
30 planes of which it is believed about a dozen actually have been delivered. The 
MKK model of the Su-30 provides advanced ground-attack capability. Coupled 
with the air superiority of Su-27 fighters which China purchased in the early 
1990s, these aircraft strengthen China's ability to threaten cross-straits action 
against Taiwan. The announcement of this new contract came shortly after 
Presidents Putin and Jiang signed the new friendship accord. Further 
coordination between the two countries is expected in maintenance and support 
of the aircraft. Whether there will be co-production of the new Su-30s, as in the 
case of the Su-27s, remains to be seen.  
 
During his four-day Russian trip to sign the Friendship Treaty, President Jiang 
also visited a weapons production facility in Volgograd that is producing the Stil 
Air Defense Missile systems. The Stil complex will be installed in Chinese 
destroyers previously purchased from Russia. Probably it was no coincidence 
that Jiang's official Russian escort for his Volgograd visit was Deputy Prime 
Minister Klebanov -- Moscow's point man in initiating overseas military sales. 
(ITAR-TASS, 1119 GMT, 17 Jul 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0717, via World News 
Connection) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
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House vs. Senate: How to deal with Ukraine? 
During the work of the US Congress on the foreign operations budget for 
FY2002, one aspect has become abundantly clear -- the House and Senate (or 
more precisely, key members of the House and Senate) are pursuing very 
different policies toward Ukraine. On the one hand, there is the apparent belief 
that aid to Ukraine must be slashed in order to send a message to President 
Leonid Kuchma about his less-than-satisfactory human rights record. On the 
other hand, the view was stressed that only continued support of Ukraine will 
allow the country to overcome its current problems. Based on recent 
Congressional debates, it is the latter argument that clearly is supported most by 
human rights workers. Unfortunately, the former has carried the day in Congress 
so far. 
 
The House of Representatives approved its version of the Foreign Operations 
Appropriations Bill on 24 July. The bill contains a one-third decrease in funding to 
Ukraine, from $170 million in FY2001 to a proposed $125 million this coming 
year. Even more importantly, the bill appears technically to allow for the 
possibility that funding could be cut further. Whereas last year's law read that 
"not less than $170,000,000 should be made available for assistance for 
Ukraine," this proposed version suggests a sum "not to exceed $125,000,000 
may be made available." (PUBLIC LAW NO. 106-429/H.R. 5526 and 
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 24 Jul 01, H4493) This cut and change of 
wording, according to one lobbyist watching the Ukrainian funding issue, "was 
carried out quietly and quickly," and when news of the impending cut became 
known "it was too late" to organize against the move. (KYIV POST, 26 Jul 01) 
 
Representative Jim Kolbe (R-AZ), chairman of the Subcommittee on Foreign 
Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs, was reportedly the 
architect of the cut. His committee's report explains the action as a protest 
against the delay in "completion of long-term projects in nuclear safety, the 
continuing setbacks to needed reform, and the unresolved deaths of prominent 
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dissidents and journalists in Ukraine." (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- HOUSE, 
24 Jul 01, H4495) 
 
In that debate on the House floor, however, opponents of Kolbe's Ukrainian 
strategy attempted to undo his change of wording -- replacing his "may be made 
available" with "should be made available" -- thus guaranteeing that Ukraine 
would receive the full $125 million allocated to it. Representative Marcy Kaptur 
(D-OH) introduced the amendment and led the debate. "Let me remind our 
colleagues," she said, "Ukraine has had major accomplishments over the last 
decade.... Ukraine refused to sell turbines to Iran giving up an economic sale in 
excess of over $100 million. The current President of Ukraine personally invited 
Pope John Paul II for an historic visit to Ukraine.... I might say to the chairman of 
the full subcommittee ... last week you spoke eloquently of not isolating China .... 
I can tell you China arrests Catholic Bishops.... So I would say do not treat 
Ukraine in a manner any worse than you would treat China."  
 
Kaptur also introduced a letter from the assistant deputy administrator of the 
National Nuclear Safety Administration suggesting that he "saw impressive 
progress due to State/AID assistance" at the Chernobyl plant, and warning that 
"cutbacks may endanger the progress made to date." She responded to Rep. 
Kolbe's comments about the disappearance of journalists with a note from 
Georgiy Gongadze's widow. "My husband," Myroslava Gongadze wrote, "sought 
the development of a free and independent media, of non-governmental and of 
local organizations to build a civil society in Ukraine -- these entities are the ones 
that desperately need America's help. The assistance provided in your bill goes 
to such programs to help the very people who need and should have American 
money and counsel, good people who will be isolated and alone without US 
support." She concluded by asking Congress, "please, do not reduce the aid to 
Ukraine that is so important in the building of a normal, democratic society." 
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Despite this debate, the Appropriations Bill passed with the wording and funding 
level suggested by Rep. Kolbe, who responded to Rep. Kaptur by voicing support 
for democratic initiatives in Ukraine but suggesting that sometimes "a stick" is 
more effective than "a carrot." 
 
Within a few days, however, the Senate Committee on Appropriations, chaired by 
Robert Byrd (D-WV), had placed itself in direct opposition to the House by 
approving an increase in funding for Ukraine. The committee has proposed $180 
million in US aid for FY2002. (PRESS RELEASE, Senate Committee on 
Appropriations, 26 Jul 01) Therefore, while the debate in the House of 
Representatives may not have altered the size or shape of the aid package 
proposed for Ukraine by that chamber, it appears to have affected senators 
examining the same problem. And if, as expected, the full Senate approves the 
funding proposed for Ukraine, an interesting debate should ensue when the two 
bills are consolidated in conference committee. 
 
One can only hope that Congress, like the president, will continue to support the 
(admittedly slow) progress Ukraine is making in many areas, especially since it 
has begun to do so with a self-sufficiency that bodes well for the future. The 
country, after all, made significant strides forward in the past year with very 
limited Western financial support. International Monetary Fund lending was 
stopped, World Bank involvement was more limited than it had been previously, 
and, even though European Union and G-8 leaders promised significant funding 
to offset the effects of Chernobyl's closure, little was actually received. 
 
Of course, President Kuchma must continue to be pressured aggressively to 
improve his human rights record; attacks on the press and opposition politicians 
must be condemned. But signaling that the United States is disengaging from 
Ukraine can serve only to isolate Kuchma further, pushing him -- and his country 
-- into the arms of big brother Russia. At the same time, independent 
organizations dependent on US funds will be weakened, and pan-Slavists will be 
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emboldened. This is clearly a scenario that no one in the US would welcome, 
and that the conference committee must work to avoid.  
 
BELARUS 
Silence abounds 
Following the recent G-8 summit in Genoa, many were quick to point to Russian 
President Vladimir Putin's success at staving off criticism regarding Chechnya. 
Despite the possibility that his government is condoning what many view as war 
crimes, he was scarcely questioned on the topic by other leaders. There is 
another issue, however, that received even less attention from leaders and 
journalists at the summit -- Putin's tacit support for the regime of Belarusian 
President Alyaksandr Lukashenka. 
 
One month before the summit, two former investigators in the Belarusian 
Prosecutor's Office released information suggesting Lukashenka's complicity in a 
number of high-profile disappearances. These disappearances were arranged, 
according to Dmitry Petrashkevich and Oleg Sluchek, by a state-sponsored 
"death squad." In a letter sent to major mass media outlets and human rights 
organizations, the former investigators wrote, "There was a group created that 
attracted at different periods of time present-day suspects in the abductions and 
murders of Ignatovich, Guz, Malik, Saushkin, and another 5 or 6 persons, 
unidentified by the investigators.... They were ordered to elaborate the scheme of 
abducting [persons] and burning corpses. The scheme had to ensure that the 
bodies would never be found. In other words, the task was to create a plan for an 
'ideal murder.'" (LETTER FROM PETRASHKEVICH AND SLUCHEK, 7 Jun 01; 
via Charter97.org) 
 
The authors apparently followed up this statement by providing US State 
Department officials with detailed accounts of the murders of Belarusian 
journalists and opposition politicians. Following their questioning, State 
Department Deputy Spokesman Phillip Reeker called the statements "credible" 
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and called on Belarusian authorities to "conduct a thorough and transparent 
investigation" into the disappearances of the people concerned. (US Department 
of State DAILY PRESS BRIEFING, 18 Jul 01) Those persons include former 
Interior Minister Yuri Zakharenko, former prime minister and opposition activist 
Viktor Gonchar, Gonchar colleague Anatoly Krasovksy and Russian ORT 
television cameraman Dmitri Zavadsky, who had once worked for Lukashenka. 
 
These revelations prompted numerous human rights watch groups to issue 
urgent appeals to world leaders to pressure not only Lukashenka for information, 
but also Putin, who is linked to the Belarusian leader through the Russia-Belarus 
Union. Simply put, Russia's support has been essential for Lukashenka's 
survival, as his dictatorial ways have isolated him from the West. Russian leaders 
not only continually speak of Belarus as Russia's partner, but also heavily 
subsidize the country. Food, energy, supplies and currency are readily supplied, 
in exchange for the country remaining within the Russian orbit, and most 
importantly, providing concessions to the Russian military and border guards. 
 
The co-chairman of the US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(Helsinki Commission), therefore, publicly urged President Bush to "raise 
concerns about the critical state of human rights and democracy in Belarus" with 
President Putin. In a letter dated 18 July, Representative Christopher H. Smith 
(R-NJ) continued, "We call upon you to encourage our G-8 partners, including 
President Putin, to press the Belarusian authorities to conduct a complete and 
transparent investigation of the disappearances, to release political prisoners, 
and to take the necessary steps to ensure free, fair and transparent presidential 
elections [scheduled for 9 September]." 
 
Despite this and other calls to press Putin on the issue, however, it appears that 
the situation in Belarus was given little, if any, attention. In fact, with the 
exception of a flurry of wire stories directly following the "death squad" 
revelations, there has been little attention paid by journalists or politicians to the 
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crisis in Belarus. True, a press conference organized by the Helsinki Commission 
and the International League for Human Rights, which featured four wives of 
"disappeared" men, garnered a bit of attention. But, it appears that the fate of a 
little country beside Russia is of little concern in the times of NMD, Middle East 
troubles, Chechnya and Tetovo. This is particularly unfortunate given the 
upcoming presidential elections in Belarus. Now is the time when changes could 
be made -- if pressure were applied in the right places by the right people. It 
seems, however, that the will to do this simply is missing. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
CHECHNYA 
July pogroms continue  
Alkhan-Kala, a suburb of Grozny, has been blockaded since 4 July: No one has 
come out of the area and little is known about the fate of the inhabitants. On 23 
July Amnesty International issued an urgent appeal to its members to send 
letters to Russian leaders calling on them to protect the residents of Alkhan-Kala 
and the other villages that have undergone "cleansings" this month, including 
Assinovskaya, Sernovodsk, Chernorechye, Kuchaloy, and Serzhen-Yurt. 
(http://www.amnestyusa.org/urgent/) Far from heeding such calls, the Russian 
government imposed new restrictions on 26 July which keep journalists reporting 
from the main Russian military base in Khankala under military supervision even 
when they leave the base. This conceals the atrocities and cleansings in the 
area. 
 
Alkhan-Kala screams for help 
What little is know about Alkhan-Kala comes from a note that was smuggled out 
of the village and passed to the Information Center of Russian-Chechen 
Friendship Society. (http://friendly.narod.ru/) 
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"Since 13 July Alkhan Kala has been subject to cleansing (zachistka) under the 
pretext of checking the passport regime. The village has been blockaded since 4 
July. Inside the village there are control posts every 150-200 meters. People are 
forbidden to walk about the village, they are not to go beyond their yards. All the 
roads in the village have been mined. Cattle in the village is getting blown up." 
 
"Ramzan Gasaev, the head of the village administration, was killed on 6 July 
after 2100 hrs (9 p.m.). He was shot by a Russian subunit for demanding a stop 
to the abuses against the people." 
 
"At night they burst into the houses and demand vodka, food, and women. There 
is marauding. Day and night they take everything out on Urals (trucks). Whatever 
they don't take they destroy. On 13 July a group of officers and contract soldiers 
called together the elders of the village and told them the following: 'Give us your 
virgins (devushki) and young women. Regardless, they will just wind up with the 
old men. We have a directive to completely destroy all the young people and we 
will fulfill this directive.'" ("U nas ustanovka polnost'u unichtozhit molodezh i etu 
ustamovky my vypolnim." ) 
 
"A large number of young men has been detained and taken away to an 
unknown destination. We have no news about them." 
 
"We are not afraid of death. We are afraid of shame. 
Save us in the name of Allah! 
The residents of Alkhan-Kala" 
 
Bonner: Moral imperative to stop genocide 
"I think that to stop the genocide should be the moral imperative for the 
Congress," Yelena Bonner advised members of the US House of 
Representatives at a luncheon on 25 July.  
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She compared the international silence regarding Moscow's war in Chechnya to 
that concerning the Holocaust -- a silence which she remembers well, having 
served as a nurse in WWII. She recounted a "cleansing" operation in a Chechen 
village where "in 30-35 degree Celsius heat, villagers were taken to a field, their 
papers were checked, then people were ordered to strip and stand on corrugated 
iron sheets -- like a frying pan. Many people died right there in the field."  
 
"Years ago when people were being taken by the Nazis to (camps) and word 
came back of what was happening there, the reaction was complete disbelief. 
And I understand when I talk about Chechnya, it is the same," she said. 
(AGENCE-FRANCE PRESSE, 25 Jul 01; via lexis-nexis)  
 
This time, however, no one in the US government can say that he did not know. 
In fact, it was Bonner who told them nearly two years ago in her testimony to the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee: "This is genocide. This not just another 
routine violation of human rights, this is a crime against humanity. And this can 
no longer be exclusively the internal affair of Russia...." (FEDERAL NEWS 
SERVICE, 4 Nov 01; via lexis-nexis)  
 
UCSJ reports persecution of Chechens in all parts of Russia 
"Ethnic persecution of Chechens in the Russian Federation," a special report 
published by the Union of Council for Soviet Jews, documents widespread cases 
of discrimination against ethnic Chechens in the Russian Federation. The report 
shows that Russia's systematic atrocities and human rights abuses in Chechnya 
have bred a climate of impunity for hate groups throughout Russia. Moreover, 
"official grass-roots discrimination and mistreatment of Chechens (and others 
from the Caucasus) occur throughout the country." There is widespread and 
frequent official tolerance of discrimination, harassment, and violence against 
Chechens and in some cases incitement of ethnic hatred by government officials. 
Many kinds of incidents were reported from 26 regions. Some were 
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administrative measures, such as refusals to grant permission to build a mosque, 
arbitrary passport checks, and quotas on numbers of Chechen residents. Other 
forms of intimidation included violent repressions, such as evictions and 
deportations, beatings, and pogroms in outdoor markets.  
 
The report finds that the "dangerous implications for other unpopular ethnic and 
religious minority groups are obvious -- the Russian state, in alliance with grass 
roots hate groups, has set a precedent vis-à-vis the Chechens, thus increasing 
the probability that other groups, including Jews, may face similar persecution in 
the future." Further indications that the racial violence of the present won't fade 
are the findings that these attitudes are inculcated in the military to draftees. 
Another troubling indicator, a poll in St. Petersburg, showed that racist attitudes 
were nearly twice as likely to occur among young persons ages 18-25 than 
among persons over 59 years. 
(www.fsumonitor.com/stories/chechen_report.htm) 
 
Sergei Kovalev points to authoritarian trends ... 
Sergei Kovalev, parliamentarian and human rights champion, published a very 
sophisticated analysis of Putin's policies in the 9 August issue of The New York 
Review of Books. Leaving aside the Chechen war, which he characterizes as 
"criminal, bloody, hopeless, and ... cynical," Kovalev turns to the main directions 
of Putin's policies: solidifying control over the regional governments and the mass 
media. The law on political parties and the "reform" of the Federation Council 
have disenfranchised the citizens of the regions: the former by disbarring 
regional parties from national, regional, and municipal elections, and the latter by 
making membership in the Federation Council an appointed rather than elected 
office.  
 
Against the media, Putin has employed the ideology of derzhavnost "the view of 
the state as a highly valuable mystical being that every citizen and society must 
serve." A government not accountable to the voter acts as though it needs 
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protection against criticism from the press and public. This logic follows not from 
Communist doctrine but from the Soviet past, and resembles the justifications for 
the Soviet suppression of dissidents. In fact, "there have been indications that 
Russia's fledgling civil society is next -- in particular, human rights organizations." 
A campaign against the "destructive struggle" waged by such independent 
groups, Memorial chief among them, began in June.  
 
Additional facts that bolster Kovalev's case but were not included in the article 
perhaps appeared after the New York Review went to print. First, the Yaroslavl 
regional branch of Memorial was dissolved ostensibly due to problems with its 
registrations. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 12 Jul 01)  
 
... But underestimates Putin's record 
Second, Putin, it appears, is no novice at political repression. Whereas Kovalev 
conjectures that "Putin apparently was not involved in such persecution" [of the 
dissidents], new evidence suggests that the Russian president had been involved 
personally. Revelations that appeared in Italy on 11 July, based on interviews 
with sources in the FSB and the St. Petersburg municipal administration, indicate 
that Putin received training in the Fifth Main Directorate, responsible for hunting 
dissidents. (A summary of the original 11 July reporting by La Republicca 
appeared in Kommersant, 12 Jul 01; via WPS agency) 
 
In January 2000, J. Michael Waller suggested as much in the pages of 
Perspective. Citing interviews with Victor Yasmann, now of the American Foreign 
Policy Council, Waller -- whose newest venture is the online news service, Global 
Security News (www.GlobalSecurityNews.com) -- reported:  
 
"Victor Yasmann raises the possibility that Putin was an officer in the Fifth Chief 
Directorate, the KGB division that served as the political police, ideological 
enforcement and domestic spying unit. Though the Fifth was almost purely an 
internal operation -- it ran the informant networks and psychiatric prisons, 
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maintained the secret political dossiers on individuals, persecuted dissidents and 
religious believers, and served as the backbone of the latter-day Soviet police 
state -- it did maintain a foreign presence to watch Soviet citizens abroad and to 
liaise with the political police sections in satellite regimes like East Germany. 
(http://www.bu.edu/iscip/vol10/Waller.html) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Fabian Adami 
 
Press censorship and human rights abuses reach new levels 
In the wake of German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer's recent tour of Central 
Asia, Uzbek President Islam Karimov and Kyrgyz President Askar Akaev both 
have made high-profile statements regarding their countries' economies and 
political systems.  
 
President Karimov chaired a cabinet meeting on 17 July during which he 
attacked his country's Soviet past and aired his conviction that it is vitally 
important that private business be developed in the country. Uzbekistan, he 
argued, must change the structure of her economy, for "Uzbekistan will not 
survive, if it produces only raw materials and semi-finished goods." (EURASIA 
INSIGHT, 18 Jul 01; via Eurasianet, Uzbekistan Daily Digest)  
 
While such statements are promising if viewed in isolation, it is clear that they are 
intended for Western ears, and are made with the aim of ensuring that aid 
continues to flow. Both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan continue to have appalling 
human rights records. A report published on 18 July by the International Helsinki 
Federation for Human Rights details their abuses.  
 
It is especially ironic, given President Karimov's anti-Soviet views, that his 
government is resorting to increasingly Stalinist methods to silence dissent. The 
 23 
IHF report outlines two specific cases: those of Yelena Urlaeva and Ruslan 
Sharipov. Urlaeva, according to the report, was arrested while leading a 
demonstration. Since her arrest, she has been held in various psychiatric 
hospitals, and has been forcibly "treated" with strong psycho-pharmaceutical 
drugs. When members of the IHF mission interviewed her, she was adamant that 
there are others like her who are being "neutralized through mental confinement." 
[INTERNATIONAL HELSINKI FEDERATION MISSION TO CENTRAL ASIA 
REPORT (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan),18 Jul 01) At the same time, 
Ruslan Sharipov, a leading member of the Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan, 
said that he has been the subject of overt police intimidation, including threats to 
his mother and sister.  
 
Most notable about this report is that it specifically addresses the Uzbek 
government's claim that such measures are necessary, due to the threat posed 
by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU): "While the IHF acknowledges that 
the existence of the IMU is a threat, it concludes that the current fight against 
terrorism serves mainly as a pretext for repressive measures. The situation in 
Kyrgyzstan clearly is similar, although the IHF does not mention specific cases in 
its Kyrgyz report. The Kyrgyz prosecutor, for example, has decided to press new 
charges against former opposition leader Feliks Kulov, who is already serving a 
seven-year sentence on politically motivated charges. (EURASIA INSIGHT, 18 
Jul 01; via Eurasianet, Kyrgyzstan Daily Digest)  
 
Just as disconcerting as the human rights abuses is the recent crackdown on the 
press in both countries. In Bishkek, Kyrgyz journalists were forbidden from 
meeting with Topchubek Turgunaliev, leader of the Erkindik Party opposed to 
President Akaev's rule, who, like Kulov, is serving a sentence on political 
charges. (EURASIA INSIGHT, 18 Jul 01; via Eurasianet, Kyrgyzstan Daily 
Digest)  
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The most blatant censorship action occurred in June 2001. The independent 
newspaper ResPublika, planned to print in its Kyrgyz-language edition an article 
from UK newspaper The Guardian which alleged that President Akaev's wife had 
received illegal stocks in the newly built Hyatt Regency Hotel in Bishkek. The 
state secretary of the Kyrgyz Republic asked the newspaper's editor to withhold 
the article. The next day, Bishkek's only printing house, Ushkun (which is 95% 
government-owned), received a telephone call from the National Security 
Service, ordering that the newspaper should not be printed. (IHF MISSION TO 
CENTRAL ASIA REPORT, 18 Jul 01) 
 
In Tashkent, coercion of the press has been just as notable, and the tactics just 
as direct. President Karimov recently involved himself in the issue, making a 
speech late in June which called for journalists to improve the quality of their 
writing. On 6 July, the government acted, when a Russian-language newspaper, 
Tashkentskaya pravda, opened an exhibition titled "Without Censorship," in 
which articles banned by the Uzbek authorities were posted. The editor of the 
newspaper, Alo Hodjaev, was ousted when regional authorities announced that 
his newspaper would merge with its Uzbek-language partner, Toshkent 
Haquqati, and one editor would control both. According to other journalists who 
participated in the exhibition, Hodjaev's ouster is the coup de grace for freedom 
of expression in Uzbekistan. (EURASIA INSIGHT, 18 Jul 01; via Eurasianet, 
Uzbekistan Daily Digest) Although these examples do not paint a complete 
picture of the situation in Central Asia, they serve as an illustration that 
statements on reform from the leaders of these countries should be taken not as 
genuine, but rather as deliberate attempts to curry favor with, and secure the flow 
of aid from, Western countries. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Maria Metcalf 
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NATO allies, NATO aspirants no longer recoil at Russia's 'red line' 
In the past, whenever Russia warned the international community that the border 
of former Soviet states marked the 'red line' for NATO enlargement, such 
declarations caused Western apprehension regarding potential Baltic NATO 
membership. However, while Russia continues to reiterate the hackneyed 'red 
line' threat, of late less and less account is being taken. As far as the US and its 
NATO allies are concerned, offering security to the Baltic republics has 
superseded the tendency to appease Moscow. In fact, it seems that Russia itself, 
while still going through the motions, is beginning to realize that the train is 
leaving the station. 
 
In an interview with Burkhard Bischof of Die Presse, Estonian Prime Minister 
Mart Laar confirmed that Estonia isn't overawed by Russian objections to Baltic 
NATO membership. Laar said, "Estonia itself has long been oriented entirely 
toward the west, so Russia's position toward us has no overriding importance 
anymore... Russian resistance will pass, just as it vanished during the admission 
processes for Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary." Laar made the usual 
ceremonial bow, saying that Estonia wants a good relationship with Russia and is 
committed to supporting Russia "along its path toward democracy and the market 
economy." (DIE PRESSE, 16 Jul 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0716, via World News 
Connection)  
 
In February, Dmitri Rogozin, chairman of the Duma's Committee on International 
Affairs, had warned that, in the event of Baltic NATO membership, relations 
between the Baltic states and Russia would be wrecked. (See THE NIS 
OBSERVED, 28 Feb 01) Rogozin threatened that, "Nonstrategic missiles and 
long-distance artillery would be targeted on Estonia. All strategic NATO sites -- 
bridges, airfields, power plants, ports, administrative buildings -- would become 
targets for them. Would these measure by the Russian military add anything 
positive to our relations? I'm not convinced of it." (BNS, 1354 GMT, 16 Feb 01; 
FBIS-SOV-2001-0216, via World News Connection) Rogozin made similar 
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statements in Kaliningrad at a 12 July meeting of legislators from Russia, 
Lithuania, Poland and the European Parliament. He said, "If the process of the 
expansion of military blocs is expanded in Europe, Russia, quite naturally, will 
find it expedient to take reply measures of the same sort, because NATO is a 
military organization." However, that statement was vaguer than the 'red line' 
threats of February. The Kaliningrad statement seems more like going through 
the motions.  
 
On 9 July, the Lithuanian Navy's frigate, the Zemaitis, joined the international 
"Cooperative Ocean 2001" military exercise in the Baltic Sea. In addition to the 
Zemaitis, the exercise included frigates (some with helicopters) from seven 
NATO countries, a British tanker and a Norwegian submarine. The flotilla 
conducted exercises in Lithuania's territorial waters, 6-12 July, before continuing 
the exercise in Poland's territorial waters. As an indication of progress toward 
ensuring the compatibility of the Baltic military elements with each other and with 
their NATO counterparts, their joint naval unit, Baltron, received favorable ratings 
from its officers and from NATO naval advisors. (Jamestown Foundation 
MONITOR, 13 Jul 01) The commander-in-chief of NATO Regional Headquarters, 
Allied Forces North Europe, General Sir Jack Deverell, visited Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania on 10-12 July. Deverell gave good marks to the joint Baltic 
decision to focus on training a professional military. (BNS, 1353 GMT, 12 Jul 01; 
FBIS-SOV-2001-0712, via World News Connection) 
 
Probably not coincidentally, for the first time in 10 years, Russia's Baltic Fleet 
conducted a war game in the country's westernmost region -- Kaliningrad. The 
Russian Baltic Fleet trained command and staff on a large scale, including naval, 
ground, air force, and air defense personnel, as well as border troops. Monitor 
reported that the scenario of the exercise "envisaged that Russian forces stop 
and destroy two NATO brigades that supposedly cross into that Russian exclave 
from Poland." (Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 13 Jul 01) Additionally, on 26 
July the members of the Russian Security Council discussed the situation in 
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Kaliningrad. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 26 Jul 01; via FBIS-SOV-2001-0726, via 
World News Connection) On the table at the meeting was whether to increase 
the number of troops and military hardware in the Kaliningrad exclave. The 
decision was made not to increase their size for the time being. The commander 
of the Russian Baltic fleet, Vice Admiral Vladimir Valuev, stated that the 
development of the fleet would depend above all on relations with the 
neighboring countries and NATO. (BNS,1050 GMT, 26 Jul 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-
0726, via World News Connection) 
 
With rapidly increasing support from NATO allies for Baltic membership, Russia 
appears to be making a last-ditch effort at least to rekindle a mostly exhausted 
enlargement debate in the West. This is taking the form of an appeal to the 
solidarity of a Europe that wants someday to be "free of US bullying." This is 
likely to be Russia's last stand against the seeming inevitability of a NATO 
membership invitation to the Baltic States. It will not work, but it may be Putin's 
stunt to induce the Europeans at least to compensate Russia and to avoid 
isolating it.  
 
LATVIA 
Five steps forward, one step back? 
Latvia definitely seems to be on the hot track to EU membership, but a 
controversial essay contest has generated Russian demands that international 
organizations assess the "Russophobic" and "chauvinistic" content of the essay 
topic. (BNS, 1249 GMT, 26 Jul 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0726, via World News 
Connection) On 20 July, European Commissioner for Enlargement Guenter 
Verheugen and Latvian Foreign Minister Indulis Berzins agreed that Latvia's 
acceptance into the European Union is virtually a reality already. Yet, while 
Verheugen was commending Latvia's achievements toward joining the European 
Union, and Latvia was closing the difficult social charter (16th of 31 chapters) of 
membership talks (LETA, 0948 GMT, 20 Jul 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0720, via World 
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News Connection), Latvian officials had to defend their country's commitment to 
pursuing the course of social integration, human rights and justice. 
 
On 12 June the obscure Vieda publishing house produced a book containing 75 
essays from the contest "We Will Not Give Latvia to Anyone," which focused 
(among other topics) on the need to drive Russians away from Latvia, stressed 
anti-EU sentiment opposed selling of Latvian property to foreigners, and spouted 
extreme nationalism. (BNS, 1640 GMT, 11 Jul 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0711, via 
World News Connection) Vieda's publishing director, Social Democrat Janis Leja, 
is also a member of the Latvian parliament. The Latvian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs stated that the essay contest represented "the efforts of a small group to 
attract attention in a time when Latvia's European and transatlantic integration is 
strengthening, with no support for such efforts in the Latvian society." (BNS, 1640 
GMT, 11 Jul 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0711, via World News Connection) The 
Russian foreign ministry called the essay contest "full of racist and fascist 
remarks which lay grounds for future ethnic cleansing in young souls." (BNS, 
1037 GMT, 11 Jul 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0711, via World News Connection) 
During Verheugen's visit to Latvia, Leja handed the EU enlargement 
commissioner a letter in which the Social Democrat threatened civil war. Latvian 
Prime Minister Andris Berzins asked the security police to investigate Leja's 
threat. 
 
Latvia's Bureau for the Protection of the Constitution, the top national security 
agency, announced that there was no legal basis for opening a criminal case 
against the Vieda publishing house and declared that, while the contest and book 
were intended to incite national hatred, Vieda was protected by the freedom of 
views and speech guaranteed by the Latvian constitution. The positive side of the 
controversial essay contest was that, through the scandal, Latvia has reaffirmed 
its commitment to defending the rights protected by its constitution, while in 
Russia, constitutional freedom of speech and opposing political values is 
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generally disregarded... as can be seen in the ongoing attack on the 
independence of the media. 
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